Take a stand on your decisions, or take a sit: posture does not affect risk preferences in an economic task by Megan K. O’Brien & Alaa A. Ahmed
Submitted 5 April 2014
Accepted 17 June 2014
Published 17 July 2014
Corresponding author
Alaa A. Ahmed,
alaa.ahmed@colorado.edu
Academic editor
Joao Rocha
Additional Information and
Declarations can be found on
page 13
DOI 10.7717/peerj.475
Copyright
2014 O’Brien and Ahmed
Distributed under
Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0
OPEN ACCESS
Take a stand on your decisions, or take a
sit: posture does not affect risk
preferences in an economic task
Megan K. O’Brien
1 and Alaa A. Ahmed
1,2
1 Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO,
United States
2 Department of Integrative Physiology, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO,
United States
ABSTRACT
Physiological and emotional states can affect our decision-making processes, even
when these states are seemingly insignificant to the decision at hand. We examined
whether posture and postural threat affect decisions in a non-related economic
domain. Healthy young adults made a series of choices between economic lotter-
ies in various conditions, including changes in body posture (sitting vs. standing)
and changes in elevation (ground level vs. atop a 0.8-meter-high platform). We
compared three metrics between conditions to assess changes in risk-sensitivity:
frequency of risky choices, and parameter fits of both utility and probability weight-
ing parameters using cumulative prospect theory. We also measured skin conduc-
tance level to evaluate physiological response to the postural threat. Our results
demonstrate that body posture does not significantly affect decision making. Sec-
ondly, despite increased skin conductance level, economic risk-sensitivity was un-
affected by increased threat. Our findings indicate that economic choices are fairly
robusttothephysiologicalandemotionalchangesthatresultfrompostureorpostu-
ralthreat.
Subjects Neuroscience, Kinesiology, Psychiatry and Psychology, Computational Science
Keywords Decision-making, Neuroeconomics, Economic lottery, Risk-sensitivity, Posture,
Threat, Skin conductance, Prospect theory
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever wondered whether you were in the right frame of mind to make a decision?
Converging evidence suggests that physiological and emotional states affect decision
making, even when these states are not particularly salient to the decision task. For
example, a recent study demonstrated that metabolic state can alter risk-sensitivity in an
unrelatedeconomicdecision-makingtask,suggestingsimilarneurobiologicalcorrelations
for the representation of value and uncertainty across task domains (Symmonds et al.,
2010). Another group found that action planning can influence our perceptions (Witt &
Brockmole, 2012). When holding a gun, subjects were more likely to perceive objects held
byothersasguns,andtheyweremorelikelytoexhibitthreateningbehavior,suchasraising
the gun to a shooting posture. When holding neutral objects, such as a ball or a shoe,
subjects were more likely to identify objects held by others as neutral objects rather than
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biasesperception(i.e.,planninganactioninvolvingagunresultsinabiastoidentifyother
objectsasguns)becauseaction-basedandperceptualrepresentationsinvolvesharedneural
processes. Indeed, there could be many subtle changes in our bodies or environment that
contributetochoiceswemakeunderrisk.
Previous studies have found physical and neurobiological implications of adopting
certain body postures. For instance, standing is less comfortable than sitting, causing
more fatigue and particular discomfort in the feet and lower limbs over prolonged period
of time (i.e., 90 min) (Chester, Rys & Konz, 2002; Drury et al., 2008). Standing is more
biomechanically unstable than sitting and is more likely to result in a fall. Standing
is also more cognitively loading than sitting, requiring greater attentional demands
to maintain the posture (Teasdale et al., 1993; Lajoie et al., 1993; Lajoie et al., 1996).
High-power poses—in which the body is open and expansive—increase testosterone
and decrease cortisol levels, whereas low-power poses—in which the body is closed and
contracted—have the opposite effect (Carney, Cuddy & Yap, 2010). Posture may also
influence our perception, performance, and decision-making processes, potentially as
a result of the accompanying physiological changes. More comfortable postures can
enhance performance in memory tasks (Lipnicki & Byrne, 2005; Yardley et al., 2005),
while less comfortable positions can improve reaction time (Vercruyssen & Simonton,
1994). Adopting high-power poses for as little as one minute leads to increased feelings of
power as well as risk-seeking behavior in a gambling task (Carney, Cuddy & Yap, 2010),
congruous with the neuroendocrine profiles that accompany such poses. However, this
risk-seeking behavior was found for monetary losses and involved a single lottery, rather
thanexaminingarangeofmonetaryamountsandprobabilities.Itisunclearwhethermore
neutral,commonplaceposturessuchassittingorstandingwouldinfluencerisk-sensitivity
for monetary gains. In an earlier study of risk-sensitivity for a motor task, we found that
subjects were more risk-seeking in a standing whole-body movement than in a seated
arm-reaching movement (O’Brien & Ahmed, 2013). Was this difference in risk-sensitivity
due to the types of movement, or simply because of the sitting and standing postures? In
the present study, we sought to differentiate possible changes in risk-sensitivity due to the
posturesthemselvesusinganon-motortask.
Postural threathas alsobeen shownto alter ourbehavior, particularlyin themovement
domain.Therearemultipleexamplesofalteredposturalcontrolinthecontextofminimal
increases in postural threat: forward vs. backward leaning (Manista & Ahmed, 2012),
standingwithanarrowvs.awidestancewidth(Pienciak-Siewert,Barletta&Ahmed,2014),
and standing on a reduced base of support (Huang & Ahmed, 2011). Modest changes
in elevation also induce marked changes in motor control and physiological arousal,
indicating greater anxiety (Ashcroft et al., 1991; Brown et al., 2002; McKenzie & Brown,
2004; Brown et al., 2006; Brown, Polych & Doan, 2006). When asked to walk or simply
standonanelevatedplatform,bothyoungandoldadultsreducethevelocityandextentof
their movements (Adkin et al., 2002; Carpenter et al., 2006; Adkin et al., 2008; Davis et al.,
2009;Lamarcheetal.,2009).Duringquietstanding,posturalcontrolvariablesarescaledto
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increasing in frequency at higher elevations, up to 1.6 m but as low as 0.81 m (Carpenter,
Frank & Silcher, 1999; Adkin et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001). At a surface height of
0.81 m, individuals adopt a stiffening strategy during quiet standing, increasing activity
in anterior leg muscles and shifting their COP away from the surface edge (Carpenter et
al., 2001). Typically, these changes are attributed to a fear of falling that affects the action
selection process of the central nervous system (CNS). If changes in movement tasks on
elevated platforms are a result of the feelings of threat experienced while standing on the
platform, then it is feasible that these emotions will influence risk-sensitive behavior in
non-motortasksaswell.
Together, these findings compel us to further examine the effects of physiological and
emotional state on decision making. Here we specifically studied the influence of body
posture and postural threat on economic decisions. Subjects performed a two-alternative
forced choice lottery task under various conditions. We compared their risk preferences
across two body postures (sitting vs. standing) and two levels of postural threat in the
form of elevation (ground level vs. atop a 0.8 m platform). We expected that the more
uncomfortable body posture (standing) and higher postural threat (atop the platform),
wouldleadtomorerisk-aversechoicesduringeconomicdecisionmaking.Thisconjecture
is predominantly based on preceding investigations of the role of affect in judgment and
decision making, which suggest that our actions are often based on avoiding negative
emotions (Slovic, 1987; Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al.,
2002; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Slovic et al., 2004). Because standing induces relative
discomfort, biomechanical instability, and attentional demands, and because elevation
magnifies a fear of falling, we anticipated that subjects’ desire to avoid such negative
states would contribute to a desire to avoid risk that would carry over to the economic
domain. If risk-sensitivity were altered by even subtle changes in feelings of discomfort or
threat, this would further assert that consideration of state is fundamental to the ability
to mechanistically predict decisions across domains. Conversely, similar risk-sensitivity
between conditions would indicate that economic choices bear a level of resistance to
physiologicalandemotionalchanges.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics statement
All subjects provided written informed consent before participation. The experimental
protocol (12-0458) was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Colorado Boulder in accordance with federal regulations, university policies, and ethical
standardsregardinghumansubjectresearch.
Experimental protocol
Thirteen healthy subjects (8 females, 5 males; mean age, 23.1 ± 2.2 years) participated in
this experiment. These subjects were part of a broader study examining the influence of
threatonnon-motorandmotortasks.Subjectsmadechoicesinaneconomiclotteryseries
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Low), sitting at high elevation (SIT High), and standing at high elevation (STAND High).
Throughout a series, subjects were asked to choose between two lotteries, where each
lotteryhasadifferentmonetaryrewardandprobabilityofwinningthatreward.
For the Low conditions, subjects either sat in a chair or stood at the edge of a forceplate
(AMTI Dual-Top AccuSway, which is 4.5 cm in height). For the High conditions, subjects
sat in the same chair or stood on the same forceplate at the edge of an elevated platform,
0.8mofftheground.Theheightofthisplatformwasequivalenttothatofanaveragetable
or desk, and it is approximately the average height at which young adults perceive they
would not be able to use a step down strategy to descend from an elevated surface (Brown
& Frank, 1997). When standing in either elevation condition, subjects were secured in a
harnessandfallprotectionsystemthatcouldarrestafallbeforethesubjects’kneestouched
the platform. However, to maintain perceptions of postural threat in the presence of this
added safety, there was enough slack to the harness to allow subjects to move without
restraint,andtheywerenotallowedtoexplorethecompetenceofthefallprotectionsystem
beforetesting.
Subjects performed the SIT and STAND lottery tasks in a randomized order at each
elevation, counterbalanced across the two tasks. They completed both choice tasks at
Low elevation before performing them at High elevation. Previously, it was shown that
increasingelevationresultsinmorepronouncedchangestoposturalcontrolvariablesthan
decreasingelevation(Adkinetal.,2000).InpresentingtheLowelevationconditionfirst,we
intendedtocapitalizeontheseordereffectstomaximizechangesinposturalcontroldueto
threatand,thus,tomaximizepotentialchangesintheactionselectionprocess.
Lotteries were displayed on a computer monitor in front of the subject. In the
testing phase of the experiment, subjects simply chose between pairs of lotteries using a
two-button remote. Subjects performed 72 choice trials for each condition, where every
choice completed a single trial. Lottery information for each trial was shown for 4 s; the
lotteriesthendisappearedandsubjectsweregiven2stoselecttheirpreferredlottery.There
werenofailedtrials;allsubjectsprovidedaresponsetoeverytrial.
After completing the four conditions, subjects participated in a realization of choices
phase. We randomly selected one trial from each condition, and the subject “played” their
choice on that trial for real money. We used a random number generator to determine
whether a subject won the monetary reward presented in that choice. Subjects were
aware of the random selection of trials to be played in order to ensure their decisions
wererepresentativeofwhattheywoulddoinareal-lifescenario.
Lottery design
We adapted a lottery series design from Wu, Delgado & Maloney (2011). Subjects chose
betweentwolotteries(AandB),eachofwhichhadadifferentmonetaryreward($y and$z)
andprobabilityofwinningthatreward(pandq).WeformulatedtheselotteriesasA($y,p)
and B($z, q). For every trial, there was one “safer” lottery and one “riskier” lottery, which
wereclassifiedbasedonthevarianceofeachlottery.Thelotterywithahighervariancewas
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 4/16Figure1 Lotterydesign.(A)Lotterieswereconstructedusinga4×4outcome-probabilitymatrix,where
each block is paired with each reference lottery (shown in yellow). (B) Sample lottery presentation.
Subjects were asked to choose between two economic lotteries, with differing monetary rewards and
probabilities of winning those rewards.
consideredtheriskieroption.
Var[A] = py2(1−p)
Var[B] = qz2(1−q).
(1)
Lottery pairs were presented in three blocks of 24 trials, for a total of 72 trials per task.
Each lottery pair consisted of a reference lottery and a varying lottery. The reference
lottery was fixed within a block, whereas the varying lottery changed from trial to trial.
We used a 4 × 4 outcome-probability matrix to construct the lottery pairs, as shown in
Fig. 1A. The reference lotteries had the same expected value. For the varying lottery, there
were four possible monetary outcomes ranging from $2.40 to $48, and there were four
possible probabilities ranging from 0.05 to 0.95. The diagonal elements of the matrix had
nearlythesameexpectedvalueandwereshownthreetimesperblock,whiletheremaining
off-diagonal elements were shown once per block. We randomized the order of the blocks
as well as the order of the varying lotteries for each subject and task. An example lottery
pair is shown in Fig. 1B. Subjects were explicitly shown the rewards and probabilities for
eachlottery,buttheywerenottoldwhichlotterywassaferorriskieronanygiventrial.
Measures of risk-sensitivity
One metric we used to compare risk-sensitivity between conditions was the frequency
of risky choices (fR) in each task. We computed fR by comparing how many times a
subject chose the riskier lottery over the safer lottery to the total number of trials in a task.
Although this metric does not provide information about risk preferences on individual
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acrossconditions.
We also employed cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to estimate subject-specific
distortions in the utilities and probabilities associated with our lotteries. In CPT,
risk-sensitivity can be explained by either a distortion in the (1) utility/value function
or (2) probability weighting function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Utility refers to the
subjective valuation of an outcome (such as money), and a utility function describes
how that valuation changes across outcomes. For instance, people tend to perceive the
difference between $5 and $10 as more meaningful than the difference between $105
and $110, even though the objective difference is $5 in both cases. This is an example of
diminishing sensitivity to increasing outcomes and can be captured by modeling utility
with a power function. Probability weighting relates the likeliness of an outcome to
the desirability of that outcome. Empirical evidence has shown that individuals weight
probabilities nonlinearly, usually overweighting small probabilities (unlikely events) and
underweightinglargeprobabilities(likelyevents).
Under the formalization of CPT, we used the following value function, v(O), and
Prelec’sprobabilityweightingfunction,w(P):
v(O) = Oα, O ≥ 0 (2a)
w(P) = exp[−(−ln(P))γ], 0 < P < 1. (2b)
The relevant parameters for utility and probability weightings are α and γ, respectively.
Distortions in utility and probability (α, γ ̸= 1) characterize risk-sensitive behavior,
with α < 1 and γ < 1 indicative of risk-aversion and underweighting large probabilities,
respectively. Conversely, α > 1 and γ > 1 are indicative of risk-seeking behavior and
overweightinglargeprobabilities,respectively.
Then,thecumulativeprospectsofthetwolotteries,A($y,p)andB($z,q),are:
ψA = v(y)w(p)
ψB = v(z)w(q).
(3)
We used a logistic choice function with constant noise (Stott, 2006; Chib et al., 2012), so
thattheprobabilitythatasubjectchooseslotteryAisgivenby:
PA =
1
1+exp[−k(ψA −ψB)]
, (4)
where k is a parameter that accounts for stochasticity in a subject’s choices. A stochasticity
parameterk = 0characterizesrandomchoice.
We used maximum likelihood estimation to estimate subject-specific distortions in
utility and probability for each task. The procedure for fitting these CPT parameters is
as follows: on the ith trial, a subject makes a choice ri. Let ri = 1 denote choosing lottery
A, and let ri = 0 denote choosing lottery B. A maximum likelihood estimation of the
parameters (α,γ,k) is one that maximizes a likelihood function over n trials, which we
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L(α,γ,k) =
n 
i=1
P
ri
A(1−PA)ri. (5)
We used MATLAB’s fminsearch function with multiple starting conditions to minimize
thenegativevalueofthislikelihoodfunctionandestimateeachsubject’sparameters.
Skin conductance
Skin conductance measurements are often used as an indicator of anxiety, affective
response, and emotional arousal. We measured changes in skin conductance throughout
thisexperimentusingtheBIOPACMP35acquisitionhardware,collectingdataat1,000Hz.
Disposable electrodes were placed on the subject’s left hand, on the distal phalanx of the
indexandmiddlefingers.Skinconductancelevel(SCL)foreachsubjectwascalculatedasa
percentincreaseoverabaselinecondition,duringwhichsubjectssatquietlyfor5min.SCL
data is available for 12 of the 13 subjects; one subject’s SCL data is not presented due to a
calibrationerror.
Statistics
We used paired t-tests to compare SCL between the sitting and standing postures and
low and high elevations. We performed a two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to determine whether there were effects of body position or elevation on our
firstmeasureofrisk-sensitivity,fR. Weusedpairedt-teststoexaminepotentialdifferences
in fR, as well as Fisher’s exact test to compare the distribution of subjects with α and γ
values greater than 1.0 between conditions. Permutation testing was employed to further
compare CPT parameter fits between conditions without making assumptions about the
underlyingdistributionofthesamples.Forallstatisticaltests,thesignificancelevelwasset
to5%.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Overview
We found no significant differences in risk-sensitivity between any conditions. Subjects
chose riskier lotteries as frequently when sitting as they did when standing, and this fre-
quency did not change between low and high elevation. Similarly, we did not see substan-
tialchangesintheparameterfitsforutilityandprobabilityweightingbetweenconditions.
Skin conductance
Mean SCL for the Low and High elevation conditions are given in Fig. 2. For each
condition, SCL was significantly higher than at Baseline (p < 0.004). There was no
difference in SCL between SIT and STAND at either elevation (Low: p = 0.89; High:
p = 0.96),thoughSCLforconditionsatHighelevationweresignificantlyhigherthanthose
at Low elevation (p < 0.002). These measurements suggest that subjects did indeed have a
physiologicalresponsetoelevation,butnottobodyposture.
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 7/16Figure 2 Skin conductance. Skin conductance levels (SCL) for all conditions relative to Baseline (quiet
sitting). SCL in all conditions was significantly higher than at Baseline (∗p < 0.004), and SCL at the High
elevation was significantly higher than at the Low elevation (∗∗p < 0.002). There was no difference in
SCL between sitting and standing conditions at either elevation.
Figure 3 Frequency of risky choices. (A) Mean frequency of risky choices (fR) for SIT and STAND
at Low elevation (filled bars) and at High elevation (outlined bars). (B) Each subject’s fR in the SIT
condition compared with that in the STAND condition, at Low elevation (filled circles) and at High
elevation (outlined circles). A data point on the line of unity indicates that the subject chose the same
number of risky lotteries in both body postures.
Frequency of risky choices
Subjects chose the riskier lottery a comparable number of times regardless of condition.
There were no significant differences in average fR between SIT and STAND at either
elevation, and fR was similar between the Low and High elevations (Fig. 3A). This figure
illustrates a slight, though consistent, trend to choose the risky lotteries less often under
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α γ k
SIT Low 0.52 [0.20, 1.38] 0.91 [0.39, 1.22] 8.37 [0, 12.08]
STAND Low 0.68 [0.28, 1.23] 0.90 [0.52, 1.24] 6.88 [1.52, 18.21]
SIT High 0.67 [0.20, 1.51] 0.79 [0.62, 1.07] 6.75 [0.90, 21.01]
STAND High 0.37 [0.25, 1.40] 0.72 [0.45, 1.34] 9.74 [2.59, 29.39]
higherposturalthreat,withmean(±SEM)fRvaluesof0.51(0.05)forSITLow,0.49(0.05)
for STAND Low, 0.48 (0.05) for SIT High, and 0.46 (0.05) for STAND High. However,
paired t-tests between do not reveal significant differences in fR between any conditions.
Figure3BillustratesthatindividualfRvaluesinSITwerenearlyequaltothoseinSTANDat
bothLowandHighelevations.Arepeated-measuresANOVAdidnotrevealeffectsofbody
posture (F = 0.11,p = 0.74), elevation (F = 0.26, p = 0.61), or an interaction between
thesefactors(F = 0.0011,p = 0.97).
CPT parameter fits
Medianparameterfitsand95%confidenceintervalsaregiveninTable1.ForbothSITand
STAND, these median fits suggest risk-averse behavior in utility and a slight tendency
to underweight large probabilities (Fig. 4). These trends hold for both elevations. A
comparison of individual subjects’ CPT parameters between conditions is illustrated in
Fig. 5. In these plots, if an individual’s general risk preferences did not change between the
conditions of interest, we would expect data points to fall in the first quadrant (indicating
consistentrisk-seekingbehaviorinα andconsistentoverweightingoflargeprobabilitiesin
γ) or in the third quadrant (indicating consistent risk-averse behavior in α and consistent
underweighting of large probabilities in γ). Such a tendency is particularly evident in
utility for both body posture and elevation. Our fits suggest more idiosyncratic behavior
in probability weighting between conditions, with a larger number of data points lying in
thesecondandfourthquadrants.Fisher’sexacttestdidnotuncoverasignificantdifference
between the number of subjects with α < 1 between SIT and STAND, nor between the
Low and High elevation conditions for either body posture. Similarly, Fisher’s exact test
did not reveal significant differences for the number of subjects with γ < 1. Pearson’s
product-momentcorrelationcoefficientwascomputedtofurtherevaluatetherelationship
between conditions based on α and γ. At both elevations, there were strong positive
correlations between body postures for each parameter. For both the SIT and STAND
conditions, there were moderate positive correlations between elevations for α; for SIT
there was a weak negative correlation between elevations for γ, and for STAND there was
a weak positive correlation between elevations for γ. Permutation tests did not reveal
significantdifferencesineitherparameterbetweenposturesorelevations.
Comparison to previous findings
Ultimately, the postures and postural threat presented in this experiment did not affect
economic decision making in healthy young adults. Our findings indicate that neutral
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 9/16Figure 4 CPT curves. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) model fits for (A) utility and (B) probability
weighting in the SIT and STAND conditions. Thick lines indicate the median curves for Low elevation
(colored) and High elevation (gray); thin lines correspond to fits for individual subjects.
postures such as sitting and standing are inconsequential to an unrelated economic task,
and risk-sensitivity in an economic domain is less sensitive to emotional state than in the
motordomain.
Previous studies have used similar lottery paradigms to investigate risk-sensitivity in
economic tasks. Wu, Delgado & Maloney (2009) and Wu, Delgado & Maloney (2011)
analyzed subject choices across economic lotteries and equivalent motor lotteries for a
rapid pointing task. Their resulting median parameters for the economic task align with
our findings, suggesting risk-aversion in utility and underweighting of large probabilities.
Jarvstad et al. (2013) found comparable trends in utility and probability weighting for an
economiclotteryseriesusingbestfitsfromeightparameterizationsoftheCPTmodel.
We expected that subjects would become more risk-averse with more difficult
postures and with increased postural threat. The different conditions presented in this
experiment—standing compared to sitting and atop the 0.8 m platform compared to
ground level—are intended to elicit feelings of discomfort, instability, and fear of falling.
Elevation in particular has a notable affect on psycho-social measures. Anxiety and
fear of falling increase at the edge of a real or virtual elevated platform, while perceived
confidenceandstabilitydecrease(Adkinetal.,2002;Cleworth,Horslen&Carpenter,2012).
These state changes are thought to induce altered performance in motor control tasks at
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 10/16Figure5 IndividualCPTfits. Individual α and γ fits compared between conditions, including (A) body
posture (SIT vs. STAND) and (B) elevation (Low vs. High). Risk preferences in utility were fairly
consistent between conditions, as indicated by most α values lying within in the first and third quadrants
of the plot. Probability weighting appears more idiosyncratic, with an increased number of values located
in the second and fourth quadrants for γ. Correlation coefficients and their significance are also reported
(∗p < 0.05).
increasedsurfaceheightsduetotheselectionofacautiousstrategybytheCNS.Specifically,
individuals adopt a stiffening strategy and exhibit a limited range of motion at the edge
of an elevated platform compared to ground level. Carpenter et al. (2001) showed this was
true at a height of 0.81 m, which is approximately the same height as the elevation threat
presentedinourexperiment.Wereasonedthatacautiouspolicy,resultingfromemotional
feelings of threat and manifesting itself in the motor domain (which is highly salient to
postural threat due to the potential for a fall), could also influence risk-sensitivity in an
unrelatedeconomictask.
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 11/16Concerning our examination of postures, we have described that standing is less
comfortable, more unstable, and more cognitively loading than sitting. Cognitive
loading has been shown to alter risk preferences, as Whitney, Rinehart & Hinson (2008)
demonstratedinadual-taskstudyofworkingmemoryandeconomicdecisionsunderrisk.
When asked to memorize a string of alphabetic letters prior to choosing between a sure
gain or loss and a gamble, subjects chose the gamble less often than when they did not
receive a prior cognitive loading. This behavior was attributed to subjects choosing the
computationally simple option due to a limited ability to process risk under the cognitive
load. In our experiment, such behavior would lead to more risk-averse tendencies under
the additional cognitive load of standing compared to sitting. Alternatively, it has been
shown that we are more likely to choose options that have higher affective impact when
cognitive resources are engaged in other tasks (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). This suggests
that high-reward lotteries would be favored more during a task with higher cognitive
load, which would lead to more risk-seeking tendencies during standing compared
to sitting. Our findings were inconsistent with either of the above reasonings, as risk
preferencesdefinitivelydidnotchangebetweensittingandstanding.Indeed,theincreased
cognitive load during standing may not be large enough to trigger significant changes in
risk-sensitivity. The additional attention required during standing does not necessarily
deplete cognitive processes required for higher-level decisions. For example, in a study of
potentialeffectsofworkplacepostureforairportsecurityscreeners,therewasnodifference
in screening performance between sitting and standing (Drury et al., 2008). Similar risk
preferences between sitting and standing substantiate the idea that risk-sensitivity in
a movement domain, as in O’Brien & Ahmed (2013), is indeed a result of the actual
movementsandnotsimplyduetotheposturesassumedduringtesting.
Actions have previously been shown to alter our perceptions (Witt & Brockmole, 2012).
In our experiment, any action-related implications of a standing posture or increased
elevation did not appear to affect perceptions of risk, either in utility or interpretations
of probability. Despite feeling more threatened at a high elevation, as seen in skin
conductance measures, our subjects’ choices did not reflect an altered perception of the
lottery risks. It is possible, however, that our elevated platform was not high enough to
influence risk preferences. Other studies of elevation continue to see large changes in
motorbehavioratheightsgreaterthan1.5m(Adkinetal.,2000;Adkinetal.,2002;Adkinet
al., 2008; Davis et al., 2009; Cleworth, Horslen & Carpenter, 2012). Although elevations of
∼0.8 m do induce cautious motor strategies, conjunctive effects in an economic task may
be muted at such a height, perhaps because the threat is less salient to this task. Although
the platform height in this experiment was constrained by our laboratory ceiling, we are
pursuingalternativetechniquestoincreaseperceivedthreat.
CONCLUSIONS
This is the first study to examine the effect of posture or postural threat on economic
decision-making. In this experiment, we compared risk-sensitivity between four
conditions,includingmanipulationsofbodyposture(sittingvs.standing)andthreat(low
O’Brien and Ahmed (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.475 12/16elevation vs. high elevation). We recorded subjects’ choices in a series of two-alternative
economic lotteries, and we fit these choices to a model based on cumulative prospect
theory.Neitheralteredbodyposturenorincreasedposturalthreataffectedrisk-sensitivity.
Skin conductance, a measure of physiological arousal, did not change with body posture
but did increase with elevation, confirming that the protocol was sensitive enough to
discriminate between conditions. We conclude that economic choices possess a degree of
robustness relative to emotional state, remaining relatively consistent in the presence of
modestposturalthreat.
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